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THE VOTING GAME 
 
SARAH R. ROBINSON* 
 
“People will stop at nothing now that they understand that voting is a game and 
that whoever is in charge can change the rules anytime.”1 
 
In the summer of 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional 
the most effective provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("V.R.A.")2 in 
Shelby County v. Holder.3 The ruling would have the effect of allowing 
several jurisdictions, mostly in Southern states, to freely enact restrictions on 
voting procedures without the federal oversight that had previously been 
required. By this decision, the Court placed a new burden on Congress to 
develop new and complex criteria for minority protections.  Given the highly 
polarized status of Congress, however, most commentators agree that the 
passage of such legislation anytime in the near future is unlikely.  Yet, the 
factual record about the state of discrimination in previously covered 
jurisdictions presented to the Court in Shelby County, and which was 
confirmed by the restrictive voting policies enacted by various states 
immediately thereafter, prove that the decision will have dire consequences 
for the power of minority votes, primarily in the South. 
 
The V.R.A., and its provision of oversight of potentially racially 
discriminatory voting procedures, had been one of the most popular and 
longstanding pieces of legislation in the latter half of the 20th century.  The 
Act, in its 2013 form, had withstood extensive Congressional oversight, and 
had been reenacted in 2006 with overwhelming support. The decision to 
strike it down, therefore, was a bold exercise of judicial power.  
 
Although the decision had enormous political and historic import, its 
conclusion stands on shaky legal ground. In this note, I bring in the 
perspective of a veteran voting rights attorney from South Carolina and some 
of my own views to outline some of the ways in which I believe that the 
decision failed to establish a justification for striking a duly authorized act of 
Congress that has a profound impact on the landscape of minority voting 
rights in the United States.  
* J.D. CUNY Law School (2008), Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of New York  
1 Telephone Interview with Armand Derfner, Partner, Derfner, Altman & Wilborn (August 25th, 
2013). 
2 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
3 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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The decision is flawed for a number of reasons:  failing to properly 
articulate a standard for overturning an act of congress in this context, 
inserting seemingly wholly invented legal doctrines, and judicial 
overreaching.  The majority criticizes the VRA as placing an overly disparate 
a burden on the formerly covered jurisdictions, but it glosses over the ways in 
which the Act will allow those jurisdictions to unburden themselves.       
The majority does not engage with the extensive Congressional findings used 
to justify the VRA’s thoroughly deliberated reauthorization in 2005, fails to 
identify a standard of review, and places too much emphasis on the 
effectiveness of other remedies. 
 
Shelby County struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 19654, 
the provision establishing which jurisdictions would have to submit any 
proposed changes to voting procedures to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia or the U.S. Attorney General.  Section 4(b) struck 
down the criteria for preclearance, but it left the Section 5 preclearance tool 
intact, but inert.  Without Section 4(b), Section 5’s preclearance requirements 
cannot be applied to any jurisdiction until Congress develops a new coverage 
formula.  Those jurisdictions that have been released from the preclearance 
requirement were mostly in the South, and the majority opinion commented 
that the South's progress toward racial equality since the 1960's justified 
unburdening it from preclearance.5 
 
The Court based its 23 page decision on principles of federalism and 
"equal sovereignty" between the states, expanding on some of its holding in a 
2009 case, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder.6 That decision challenged coverage by the Voting Rights Act, and 
held that the Voting Rights Act “imposes current burdens and must be 
justified by current needs”.7   
4 Prior to the changes mandated by Shelby County, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended had 
several provisions.  Section 2 is a prohibition against States enacting any voting measure that 
would have the effect of discriminating against minority (including language minority) voters.  
Section 5 is applied only to certain States and requires that any voting measure be “precleared” by 
the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for D.C. to ensure that they do not have the 
purpose or effect of discriminating against minority voters.   Section 4(b), at issue in Shelby 
County, provides the criteria for Section 5 coverage.   Section 3 includes a “bail-in” provision and 
Section 4(a) a “bail-out” provision.  “Bail-in” is also called “pocket trigger” and it provides the 
circumstances by which a jurisdiction not covered in Section 4(b)’s coverage formula may become 
subject to preclearance.   The “bail-out” provision provides that under certain circumstances, a 
covered jurisdiction may be relieved from the preclearance requirements, based upon a showing of 
a record clean of discriminatory voting measures.  
5 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-29 (2013). 
6 Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193 (2009). 
7 Northwest Austin, 557 U. S. at 203. 
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Justice Thomas authored a three page concurrence asserting that 
preclearance should have been entirely struck down, and Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg authored at 36 page dissent arguing that the decision’s analysis 
was improper and that Congress’s 2006 re-authorization provided ample 
rationale for justifying the current coverage formula. 
   
Data From the Record 
 
One of objections the majority had with the preclearance coverage formula 
was its reliance on data from 1965.  Yet, the formula had been reauthorized 
several times by Congress after collecting a record of extensive evidence of 
continued racial discrimination and racial disparities in voting in those areas 
of the country.  The most recent re-authorization passed through Congress 
largely unopposed and on the solid foundation 15,000 pages of Congressional 
record8 and months of hearings documenting voting procedures negatively 
affecting minorities in the covered jurisdictions.   
 
The breadth and substance of this record were hardly touched upon by the 
majority in Shelby County.  As Justice Ginsburg’s well founded dissent noted, 
"without even identifying a standard of review, the Court dismissively 
brushes off arguments based on "data from the record;” and declines to enter 
the "debate about what the record shows."9  To have done so would have 
assured a finding that the burdens imposed by the preclearance requirements 
were indeed “be justified by current needs.”10 
 
The "Bail Out" Provision, Overlooked 
 
Surprisingly, although the decision relies heavily on Northwest Austin, it 
makes only passing reference to the Act’s Section 3(c)’s "bail-out" provision.  
This provision would allow a covered jurisdiction to “bail-out” of the 
preclearance requirement by demonstrating a clean record of non-
discriminatory voting procedure proposals for ten years.  The majority in 
Shelby County relies heavily on the decision in Northwest Austin to 
substantiate the relatively novel legal theories it bases its conclusions upon, 
but seems to sidestep Northwest Austin’s extensive discussion of the bail-out 
provision.  The majority in Northwest Austin had recognized bail-out as 
effective mitigation of the onerous restraints imposed by preclearance, 
although the Court never reached the question of Section 4's constitutionality 
in that decision. Bail-out squarely addresses the issues the majority has with 
8 H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 5, 11-12; S. Rep. 109-295, at 2-4, 15. 
9 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (2013). 
10 Id. at 2646 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)). 
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the age of the coverage formula’s data set.  It allows those States that have 
truly changed to come out from under the burden imposed by preclearance.   
    
The Novel Application of the "Equal Sovereignty" Doctrine 
 
One of the most unusual aspects of the decision is Chief Justice Roberts' 
utilization of the so-called "Equal Sovereignty" doctrine, which, along with 
federalism, is the main legal principle the majority relies upon to underpin 
its holding.  
 
 Equal Sovereignty, in the context of states' abilities to regulate voting, 
had only been articulated in Northwest Austin (discussed above), also 
authored by the Chief Justice.  The doctrine is further supported only by 
references to three older cases, including one proscribing disparate 
geographical treatment of the states by the federal government in a case from 
1911.11 The Court acknowledges that “equal sovereignty” as articulated in 
that case concerned the admission of new states to the Union and not how 
Congress could impose burdens on states as part of its enforcement power 
under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (the Civil War 
Amendments). 
 
The usage of the words “equal sovereignty” and the reference to that 
phrase as a “fundamental principle”12 may be seen as an effort by the 
majority to skirt the standard previously articulated for overturning an act of 
Congress to enforce the Civil War Amendments.  
  
The dissent in Shelby County argues that the standard that should have 
been used is that which set forth in South Carolina v. Katzenbach: “As 
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational 
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”13 
 
The language of the Fifteenth Amendment (“Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation”) accords Congress broad 
authority14 to enact measures to prevent minority voting suppression by “all 
11 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). 
12 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U. S. at 203). 
13 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, at 324 (1966). 
14 “The stated purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to arm Congress with the power and 
authority to protect all persons within the Nation from violations of their rights by the States.  In 
exercising that power, then, Congress may use ‘all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted’ to the constitutional ends declared by these Amendments. McCulloch, 4 Wheat., 
at 421.  So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask 
not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has rationally 
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means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and 
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution.”15  
 
Insofar as the decision in Shelby County sidesteps a lengthy discussion of 
which standard to apply, and seemingly ignores the standard applied in 
previous decision addressing the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, 
the decision fails to engage in the necessary analysis to support its bold 
abrogation of Congressional decision making.  “Substitut[ing] its own 
judgment,”16 argues Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, the majority of the 
Court affronts the balance of powers. 
 
Judge Richard Posner, writing for Slate, agreed. In a post to the website 
on June of 2013, Posner wrote of the ‘fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty’ of the states17: 
 
“This is a principle of constitutional law of which I had never 
heard—for the excellent reason that […] there is no such principle. 
Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution authorizes Congress to 
admit new states to the Union [...] Usually when new states are 
admitted it is on the same terms as the existing ones. But not 
always: Utah and several other western states were required as a 
condition of admission to outlaw polygamy—a novel condition. Not 
that any other state permitted polygamy. But other states, not 
having been subjected to such a condition when they were admitted, 
were free to permit polygamy without risk of being expelled from the 
Union. 
It’s possible that the federal government would subject a state to 
unequal treatment so arbitrary and oppressive as to justify a ruling 
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority. But Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s very impressive opinion[…] marshals 
convincing evidence that the reasons Congress has for treating some 
states differently for purposes of the Voting Rights Act are not 
selected means appropriate to a legitimate end. ‘It is not for us to review the congressional 
resolution of [the need for its chosen remedy].  It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis 
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641, 653 (1966).  
15 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819). 
16 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638. 
17 Posner, The Supreme Court and the Voting Rights Act Striking Down the Law is All, SLATE, 
June 26, 2013, available at Http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/the breakfast 
table/features/2013/supreme court 2013/the supreme court and the voting rights act striking down 
the law is all.html. 
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arbitrary, though they are less needful than they were in 1965, 
when the law was first enacted.” 
 
Similarly, in his reaction on the SCOTUSblog, Zachary Price, a 
Constitutional law professor from UC Hastings and former Department of 
Justice official, agrees that the doctrine is a recent invention that is 
misapplied in the context of the protection of minority voting rights. He notes 
that the opinion seems to imply that any federal law which treats states 
differently would be treated with a different level of scrutiny.  The opinion 
makes reference to the need for the state to demonstrate a "sufficient 
showing," but fails to explicitly link this to a higher level of scrutiny.  By 
doing this, the majority not only invented a new doctrine, but also a blurred 
new version of the tiers of scrutiny analysis.  Price writes: 
 
". . .the Constitution guarantees some other, quite specific forms 
of equality.  Congress cannot adopt unequal “Duties, Imposts, 
and Excises,” nor can it enact any “Preference . . . given by any 
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State 
over those of another.”  At least in the absence of some 
compelling reason to infer a broader unenumerated principle of 
state equality, the specificity of such guarantees suggests that no 
general rule otherwise guards states against unequal treatment 
in federal legislation."18 
 
In Northwest Austin, Roberts' citations to “equal sovereignty,” including 
U.S. v. Louisiana,19  create the illusion of stare decisis.   Even in Louisiana 
the theory is only used in the context of newly admitted states’ rights to 
natural resources within their borders.  The other cases he cites to, Lessee of 
Pollard v. Hagen20 and Texas v. White21, are even more remote in terms of 
their discussion of equal treatment of states by the federal government.   
 
Critics have posited that the Chief Justice may have been developing a 
stance against the VRA for some time.  He first introduced “equal 
sovereignty” as a “fundamental principle”22 in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
in Northwest Austin in order to justify the utility district's exemption from 
VRA’s preclearance coverage, providing the only clear usage of the doctrine in 
the voting rights context.  
18 Zachary Price, “Shelby County v. Holder: The Voting Rights Act doesn’t need to treat states 
equally, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 16, 2013, 2:23 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-
county-v-holder-the-voting-rights-act-doesnt-need-to-treat-states-equally/. 
19 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). 
20 Lessee of Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
21 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
22 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U. S. at 203). 
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Armand Derfner, a veteran voting rights litigator23 I spoke with, referred 
to a series of memos Roberts wrote when he was an assistant at the 
Department of Justice during the Act’s re-authorization in the 1980s. In 
these memos, which resurfaced during his confirmation for Chief Justice, he 
was already making arguments against the Act’s constitutionality.  Voting 
rights advocates were prescient to predict that the memos revealed the truth 
about Roberts’ attitude towards the V.R.A.   
 
The South is Slow to Shange:  Possible Results of a New Coverage 
Formula 
 
Congress never acted to update the coverage formula after the Court 
indicated in Northwest Austin that it might consider finding it 
unconstitutional in the future.24 The formula covers states that both had low 
voter turnout and registration in the 1965 general election, and which have 
in the past have enacted voter tests. Roberts' rationale depends upon the 
premise that it is unjust to tie the covered jurisdictions to voter turnout from 
half a century ago.  Implicit in the arguments made by both the majority and 
the dissent and in oral argument before the Court is the understanding that 
had Congress enacted a reform to the coverage formula that simply updated 
the voter turnout part of the law to something that reflected more recent 
numbers, some of the covered jurisdictions would have been brought out of 
the law, but Armand Derfner disagreed with that characterization.   
 
When asked about Congress’s possible adoption of a new coverage 
formula, Derfner posits that even one that is designed with relatively recent 
indications (the last 20 or 25 years) of voting discrimination such as 
settlements involving voting discrimination, objections under the voting 
rights act preclearance provision and successful section 2 litigation would 
probably bring the same jurisdictions of the Old Confederacy under 
preclearance.  
  
Other Routes to Preclearance: Section 3(c) and the Political Problem 
of Finding Intentional Discrimination  
 
Since the decision, jurisdictions formerly covered by preclearance and 
anxious to move on with restrictive voting measures have moved swiftly to 
23 Derfner has litigated key voting rights cases up to the Supreme Court, including Allen v. State 
Board of Elections (1969)  and Perkins v. Matthews (1971), helping to shape the jurisprudence of 
voting rights in America.  Currently, Derfner is participating in a private case that was brought to 
go along with the Department of Justice challenge to the voter ID law in U.S. v. Texas, No. 2:13-
cr-00263, August 22nd, 2013.  
24 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 207. 
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enact a series of measures that are being variously challenged by private 
actors and by the Department of Justice. Derfner has been involved in a case 
in Texas challenging a voter ID law that had not survived preclearance by 
the U.S. Department of Justice.  The law would require voters to present a 
state-approved form of identification before voting. On the very same day 
that Shelby County was handed down, the Texas legislature breathed new 
life into it.  
 
Derfner, the lawyers for the Department of Justice, and other civil rights 
advocates are seeking to have Texas brought in for preclearance under 
Section 3(c) which gives a federal court the power to mandate preclearance 
for a period of time to be determined by the Court upon a showing of a 
violation of the 14th or 15th Amendment.   The provision is known as the 
"bail-in" section. However, this requires a finding of intentional 
discrimination.  Travis Crum, a former federal clerk who worked with the 
federal district judge who penned the lower court’s decision in the Northwest 
Austin case wrote, in a Delphic note for the Yale Law Review in 201025, 
 
“If and when the Court invalidates section 5, the pocket trigger can 
perform triage, creating a deterrent effect and bailing-in jurisdictions 
that engage in racial discrimination in voting. [...] 
Initiated as a section 2 suit, section 3 requires a court to find—or a 
jurisdiction to admit—a constitutional violation. Under the Court’s 
plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, discriminatory intent is 
necessary to establish a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
Additionally, Mobile limits the Fifteenth Amendment’s protections to 
state action that prevents citizens from registering to vote or casting a 
ballot. Section 2’s effects test, therefore, is insufficient for pocket trigger 
litigation.  Rather, district courts must find that the jurisdiction 
intentionally denied or abridged a citizen’s right to vote on account of 
race, under either a Fifteenth Amendment ballot access standard or a 
Fourteenth Amendment vote dilution standard.” 
 
Derfner agrees with this analysis of the application of Section 3(c) in 
terms of the need to establish intentional discrimination, but argues that the 
violation does not have to involve registration or voting.  He elaborated--since 
the meaning of "abridge" in the 15th Amendment hasn't been settled, and the 
scope of the 14th Amendment can range far beyond registering, voting, and 
dilution. 
 
25 Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic 
Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010). 
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Derfner brought up an important point about findings of intentional 
discrimination: Such a finding is difficult when the judges who must make 
the finding will have to call people in their community racists.   
As an example, he recalled the social pressure surrounding the district 
court judge in a 2003 case.   As a litigator in U.S. v. Charleston County26, he 
helped challenge at-large elections of the Charleston County school board.  
Part of the complaint asked for a finding of intentional discrimination. Judge 
Patrick Duffy, found that the electoral scheme did violate Section 2, but 
didn’t find intentional discrimination.  The case was appealed to the Fifth 
Circuit, which upheld the finding of a violation of section 2 but said that it 
wasn’t necessary to reach the question of whether there was intentional 
discrimination.  It set aside his finding that there had not been a violation.   
 
Derfner said, “I have no doubt that Judge Duffy knew and believed and 
thought that there was a purposeful violation.” 
 
The ambivalence with which Judge Duffy handed down his order striking 
the school board’s scheme as having a racist effect is evident in the first two 
paragraphs of his decision.  He writes: 
“As an initial matter it is important to clarify what this Order 
rigorously says about the at-large electoral system of Charleston 
County and what it unequivocally does not say about her 
citizens. The Court recognizes that its decision does not merely 
operate mechanically against a political subdivision of the State 
of South Carolina but in fact against individual citizens whose 
lives in various measure are today changed. While the Court is 
otherwise disinclined to editorialize, those individuals, whether 
white or black, 1 who have had no voice in this debate but whose 
liberties are invariably altered by its resolution, deserve as clear 
and direct an explanation of this action as can be reasonably 
provided. There is a fundamental gravity to any decision of a 
federal court which calls into question actions taken by the 
people through the legislative process of their local and state 
communities. Federalism and separation of powers demand 
vigilant consideration… With that said, this Order is radically 
not a condemnation of the citizenry of Charleston County but 
rather a recognition that the specific bulwark of an at-large 
system… Undoubtedly there are bigots among us…”27 (emphasis 
added) 
 
26 United States v Charleston Cnty., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.S.C. 2003). 
27 Id. at 271. 
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And the judge concludes his analysis declining to find intentional 
discrimination by stating: 
 
“Certainly the timing of the General Assembly's adoption of the at-large 
system raises suspicions, but the Court will not disparage its authors without 
more compelling evidence, particularly in light of other reasonable and 
historical explanations for the adoption of the at-large system.”28  
 
Derfner recalls going to Judge Duffy’s father’s wake after the trial (“the 
Duffy’s are a big family down here”) and shaking the judge’s wife’s hand.  She 
told him, “It’s nice to see someone who doesn’t hate my husband.” 
 
Intent is difficult enough to prove, but, even in cases with plenty of 
evidence to support such a finding, judges may be reluctant to find it.  The 
bail-in right claims, if the provision is interpreted to require intentional 
discrimination, will be a much harder standard than that of the Section 2 
“effects test.” 
 
Perhaps one avenue for voting rights advocates seeking to undo some of 
the impact of Shelby County is pushing for an amendment to the bail-in 
provision to clarify that it only requires satisfaction of the "effects" test. 
 
Section 2 Preliminary Injunctions are Rarely Obtained 
 
Although Shelby County does not address the right of action and 
injunctive relief envisioned by Section 229, the Supreme Court has curtailed 
the application of Section 2 over the last 30 years.  If the Court in Shelby 
County were relying on this provision as an alternative remedy to the 
preclearance formula, critics allege, it is not nearly as effective of a protection 
against discriminatory voting practices.  
 
Section 2 cases can take years to litigate to completion, but it is possible to 
obtain a preliminary injunction that would put a stop to implementation of a 
suspect voting procedure.  The preliminary injunction standard would require 
a likelihood of winning on the merits.   Yet, since the 1970s the Court has 
required an increasingly complex analysis and presentation of data to prevail 
on a Section 2 claim.  This makes obtaining a preliminary injunction 
extremely difficult.  
 
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy suggested at oral argument that a 
preliminary injunction can be obtained to stop a potentially discriminatory 
28 Id. at 272. 
29 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619. 
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voting measure and he speculated that this could thereby provide the same 
relief as preclearance.  The Solicitor General argued that this route to halting 
discriminatory measures was a difficult one, as plaintiffs had been unable to 
obtain preliminary injunctions in only 25% of the cases.   
  
Section 2 may be an even more remote remedy than the Solicitor General 
had argued. Derfner, who has litigated numerous Section 2 cases, says that 
25% is too high an estimate of the numbers of Section 2 preliminary 
injunctions.  In an informal poll, he called around to eight or nine of the 
lawyers who do the voting rights cases across the country, and they together 
found that preliminary injunctions against proposed racist voting practices 
had actually only been obtained in less than 2% of the cases.    
 
If a preliminary injunction isn’t obtained to prevent the institution of the 
voting procedure in the particular election, whatever the results of that 
election are become a part of history.  They aren’t invalidated, even if a 
permanent injunction is later obtained. 
 
Furthermore, there is some speculation30 that Section 2, as amended in 
1982, might be struck down as unconstitutional. In a 1980 case City of Mobile 
v. Bolden31, the Court decided that Section 2 was identical to the 15th 
Amendment, and it therefore required a finding of intentional discrimination.  
This requirement sets a much higher bar for proponents of minority voting 
rights to achieve in litigation.   
 
After City of Mobile, the Act was amended, implementing an “effects” test 
into Section 2.  Some commentators believe that this amendment could be 
struck down if a case involving the “effects” test comes up to the Supreme 
Court in the wake of Shelby County. 
 
Bush v. Gore and the VRA 
 
Derfner sees possible avenues of litigation strategy in expanding voting 
rights by pushing the bounds of what is considered a “severe burden” and 
what is discrimination on its face.  He sees hope for voting rights litigators in 
Bush v. Gore.32  He sees an analogous argument to be made out of the Court's 
30 Jeffrey Rosen, Eric Holder’s Suit Against Texas Gives The Supreme Court A Chance to Gut Even 
More of the V.R.A., NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2013, available at 
http:www.newrepublic.com/article/114524/eric-holder-texas-suit-supreme-court-might-gut-more-
voting-rights.com. 
31 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
32 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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holding that having a recount of votes in some counties but not others 
amounts to impermissible discrimination.   
 
Derfner believes this rationale could be advanced to strike down the voter 
ID law in the recent Texas case, Veasey v. Perry.33 The litigants allege that 
differences in the operation of drivers’ bureaus between counties create 
disparate treatment. Since the IDs required to vote in Texas must be 
obtained there, it has the effect of a discriminatory voting practice.  Certain 
driver’s bureaus that have longer hours on more days in some counties as 
opposed to others is a facial discrimination that  requires strict scrutiny 
because people in some counties can get a photo ID and some cannot.34 
Derfner and the litigation team behind the case believe this should be 
squarely controlled by Bush v. Gore. 35 
 
The Voting Game 
 
Shelby County leaves in its wake a litany of unanswered questions about 
the future of Section 2 jurisprudence, the usage of the “bail-in” provision, and 
the rest of the heretofor lesser litigated provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 
but there is no mystery as to whether the decision represents a setback in the 
short term for minority voters in the South.  Over time, the evisceration of 
these constituencies will serve to further undermine their power to elect 
those that would fight to retain existing protections against discrimination.  
As Armand Derfner said, "They understand that voting is a game, and 
whoever is in charge can change the rules at any time."  
   
In this case, the Court’s conservative majority was in charge, and they 
have eliminated the main obstacle to arbitrary rulemaking at the hands of 
those who oppose minority enfranchisement.   
 
33 Veasey v. Perry, 29 F. Supp. 3d 896 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
34 “According to Plaintiffs' allegations, DPS offices generally provide services only Monday 
through Friday during ordinary business hours. Some Texas counties have DPS offices that are 
open fewer days or have limited hours per week and some counties have no DPS office, requiring 
voters to travel significant distances beyond their polling place to satisfy the S.B. 14 
requirements”  Id. at 900. 




                                                 
